Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Experience of the ICTY and ICTR
3. Special Court Outreach: the specifics of Sierra Leone
4. Potential Outreach Program Partners
4.1 Legal Profession
4.2 Media
4.3 Civil Society Organisations
5. Considerations for Outreach Strategy
6. Conclusion

1. Introduction

The creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone indicates the willingness and determination of both the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community to finally bring to an end the ten year conflict within the country.  Following on from the establishment of similar International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, it acknowledges the centrality of judicial accountability in attempts at restoring lasting peace to conflict ridden societies.

While the differences between the Special Court and the two International Criminal Tribunals are marked, in terms of their subject matter jurisdiction, composition and location, they nevertheless share common philosophical assumptions as to their purpose for countries and regions attempting the difficult post conflict transition to a peaceful, democratic and stable future.

Whilst the central aim of any judicial institution is the upholding of the principle of individual criminal responsibility, the International Criminal Tribunals also aim to contribute in other ways to post conflict transition.  In particular, they are aimed at: ending impunity; establishing facts around a conflict generally and particular massive abuses specifically; the establishment of individual responsibility for atrocities to overcome any tendency for apportioning blame collectively; providing victims of crimes with the opportunity to attain a sense of justice in their own individual cases; and contributing to a meaningful process of reconciliation.  Should such aims be met, the institution will contribute significantly towards the reduction of any society returning to conflict.

These different factors illustrate the centrality of the people of the conflict-ridden society that the judicial institution has been created to serve.  The aims of the institution serve a far greater number of people than those who may be called before it.  Further, for any institution to succeed in these aims, it has to ensure that the majority of the populous feel confident that it is acting in their interests.  Without their feeling of ownership -- of their being stakeholders in the judicial process and ultimately the benefactors of the process -- no institution established to reach the aims outlined above can hope to succeed.

These factors are as central to the operation and ultimate success of the Special Court as they are to either of the ad hoc International Tribunals.  With the Special Court playing such a pivotal role within overall attempts to end the conflict and establish peace in the country, it is vital that the people of Sierra Leone are clear to its exact nature and purpose and that misconceptions are prevented from developing and spreading.  Left unchecked, such misconceptions could lead to widening disillusionment with the Special Court itself, leading ultimately to the undermining of its legitimacy.  In order to prevent this and better serve the interests of justice, it is therefore essential the Special Court be as accessible and transparent as possible.

One factor that should contribute to the success of the Special Court is its very location.  Unlike either ad hoc Tribunal, its location within Sierra Leone offers the opportunity for the people of Sierra Leone to feel closer to its proceedings than has been the case in either Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia.

Yet the risk still remains that unless efforts are made to publicise the Special Court, the people of Sierra Leone may feel as distanced from its proceedings as those in central Africa and the Balkans.  Given the misconceptions that have already been evident domestically in media coverage concerning the nature of the Special Court, it is vital that the people of Sierra Leone are also clear as to its purpose and nature in order that any similar misconceptions are dispelled.

What these concerns illustrate is the need for an Outreach and Public Information Program to be established within the Special Court from the moment of the court’s inception.

This report will highlight the necessity for the establishment of an Outreach and Public Education Program from within the structure of the Special Court from the earliest opportunity.  It will highlight the experience gained from both the ad hoc Tribunals in terms of their negative perceptions by large percentages of the people of the Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the reasons identified for these perceptions and the measures taken to overcome them.

The lessons gained from the experience of the two ad hoc Tribunals will then be applied to the situation within Sierra Leone, with the similarities and differences highlighted to assess on what areas any Special Court Outreach Program would need to focus to ensure it succeeds.
 

2. Experience of the ICTY and ICTR

“It is likely that, except for a very small proportion of the populations of the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, there is large-scale, if not total lack of knowledge regarding the … ICTY and ICTR”.¹

Following their initial creation, both ad hoc Tribunals exerted their energies on attempting to ensure that their primary judicial and related administrative functions operated as effectively and efficiently as possible.  Little attention was paid as to how either institution related to the countries they were created to serve beyond the practicalities of gathering evidence, apprehending suspects and identifying witnesses.  Aside from the establishment of Press and Information Units, no other means of disseminating information concerning the structure and operations of the Tribunals nor any substantive issues were undertaken or considered: the consequences were predictable.

Recent research conducted into the consequences of this lack of outreach has tended to focus more on the experience of the former Yugoslavia than Rwanda.  Nevertheless, the lessons gained from this research is just as pertinent for Sierra Leone and illustrates problems which may be encountered by the Special Court should no outreach program be implemented.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), recent research² shows that the local media was the primary source of information regarding the proceedings of the Tribunal.  In a country as divided as BiH, where the media after the Dayton Peace Accord was so firmly in the hands of extremist factions in all communities, allowed the majority of the coverage of the workings of the ICTY to be manipulated for political gain.

This was reflected in the attitudes of NGOs interviewed for the research, who felt frustrated that the events at the Tribunal were covered in isolation, with little or no background information to place the events in context.  The groups in question, despite working on issues to which the Tribunal was relevant, had their own misconceptions about the ICTY.  They did not feel that they completely understood the work and procedures of the Tribunal and were unclear, for example, regarding the exact nature of the crimes for which people could be indicted.

The cumulative effect was to distance these NGO activists, and the people of BiH generally, from the Tribunal itself.  Indeed, one organisation representative stated that “The Hague is some distant thing that is not understood at all”.  Without access to accurate and comprehensive information concerning the workings of the Tribunal, from its organisational structure to the criteria by which indictments were issued, many groups expressed their belief that this gave scope for manipulation to occur and misconceptions to grow.³

The findings of the study are supported by further research conducted into the attitudes of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors towards the ICTY.⁴  The legal professionals from all three national groups within the country confirmed that almost all the information they received concerning the Tribunal came from local sources. The impartiality of this information was questioned “because of the nationalist slant of the communications industry in BiH”.⁵

Despite the legal professionals’ suspicions of the distortions and political manipulation of the local Bosnian media, their own perceptions of the ICTY nevertheless seemed to be influenced by the media.  Sharp divisions could be seen between the legal professionals according to their national group, yet opinions within each national group remained to some degree consistent.⁶   For example, whilst the dominant view among the Bosniak legal professionals of the ICTY was that it was a neutral and fair court, their Bosnian Serb counterparts viewed it disparagingly for its lack of impartiality and independence, and the belief that it exclusively targeting members of their own national group.  Ultimately, the Bosnian Serbs legal professionals saw the Tribunal as a political body, under the influence of the Western powers.

As the report’s authors point out:

“It is abundantly clear that Bosnian legal professionals did not have accurate information about the ICTY.  At best, this confusion generated misunderstandings on the part of those legal professionals who supported the ICTY.  At worst, the absence of correct and information has fueled suspicion and hostility among those Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb participants who viewed the ICTY as the authoritative and critical voice of the international community.”⁷

Both these studies confirmed suspicions prevalent at the time within the ad hoc Tribunals that without a concerted attempt to ensure that their activities were understood, the opportunity to contribute towards a sustainable peace in each region would be lost.  As the Presiding Judge of the ICTY stated at the time: “Our decisions are to help to bring about reconciliation, but our decisions can not do that … if there isn’t a belief that the tribunal is fair, that the decision-makers are fair”.⁸

Both Tribunals established outreach programmes which aimed at combating the misperceptions, misinformation and propaganda which threatened their work.  Based within the offices of each Tribunal’s Registry, and working in conjunction with each Press Office, both devised strategies specific to their region.

The ICTY programme has over time established offices in Zagreb, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Prishtina and now Belgrade.  Likewise, in late 2000, the ICTR opened its Information and Documentation centre in the Rwandan capital of Kigali.

The establishment of these offices aimed to overcome the most obvious difficulty encountered by both Tribunal: the physical distance of their seat from the countries they were serving.  The creation of outreach offices in these different locations aimed to ensure there was a localised focal point for each Tribunal, to enable people the opportunity to directly approach each for accurate information.

From these locations, contacts have been forged with representatives of local media, NGOs and the legal profession.  Distribution networks have been established through which, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croatian translations of ICTY documents have been processed, the recipients being libraries, governmental, judicial and academic libraries.  The regional outreach offices also allowed the Tribunal’s press and publicity unit the opportunity to distribute ongoing information concerning the activities at The Hague.

Symposiums have been held, both in The Hague and around parts of the Balkans, at which members of the judicial and legal communities have met with various members of the Tribunal.  Such meetings have allowed a formal exchange of ideas to take place between vital members of the different Balkans communities, allowing them to understand more about the judicial processes at work at the Hague, as well as enabling ICTY officials to obtain direct information as to concerns felt by their Balkan counterparts.⁹   Similar symposiums have been held at the ICTR’s seat in Arusha, with members of the Rwandan legal profession having the opportunity for intensive week-long training seminars concerning the Tribunal’s legal and judicial processes.¹⁰

To counteract misunderstandings and direct manipulation within the local media, both Tribunals have established relationships with local electronic media organisations to produce a variety of programs aired within the two regions.  These vary from live internet broadcasts of proceedings from the three ICTY Trial Chambers to regular digests of news and interviews broadcast on local television and radio networks.
 

3. Special Court Outreach: the specifics of Sierra Leone

It is fully expected that once the Court has been formally established, it will be the centre of much media and general interest within Sierra Leone.  Indeed, since the UN Security Council first adopted Resolution 1315 in 2000, the Sierra Leonean media has already spent much time and space discussing issues around the Court.¹¹   On the evidence of the majority of the coverage concerning the Special Court over the preceding 18 months, it is evident that the problems prevalent within the Balkans are at risk of being repeated within Sierra Leone.  The little public education that has been conducted so far among different sections of civil society has demonstrated the clear need for a thorough and on going outreach program.¹²

Whilst valuable knowledge can be gained from the experiences of the ad hoc Tribunals, a clearer understanding of the nature of Sierra Leonean society should first be considered to identify factors which may hinder any public education campaign if overlooked.

Two aspects of the Special Court which superficially appear to place it advantageously in comparison to the ad hoc Tribunals are its location and working language.  With its seat in Freetown and the working language of English being the official language of Sierra Leone, the Court seems to be placed in the best position when attempting to locate itself firmly among the population it is set to serve.  Yet two aspects of Sierra Leonean society will challenge this view: the capital/provinces cleavage and related ethic/linguistic cleavages.

Sierra Leone is divided into four regions, each with its own regional capital, with Freetown also serving as the regional capital for the west.  Whilst there are numerous ethnic groups within the country, a clear divide between the capital and the provinces can be detected in social and political terms.  Despite the operation of regional governmental offices, the political machinery is predominantly centred in Freetown.  Similarly, the national media is predominantly based within the capital.  This tendency for centralisation has been exacerbated by the conflict itself, with the millions of displaced moving to Freetown for security including regional political leaders, elders and journalists.

Consequently, those in the provinces believe they are permanently overlooked and excluded from many of the political processes operating within the country, whether that be within the operations of the Government or activity within civil society.  Indeed, this perception is evident in discussions around the Special Court.  Many in the provinces have questioned the inclusiveness of the court and its ability to serve the entire country given its temporal jurisdiction, believing this to reflect another Freetown bias as the conflict was not visited upon the capital until after November 1996.  An undercurrent of resentment certainly exists within parts of the provinces that justice may not be served on the perpetrators of the crimes committed prior to November 1996, which almost exclusively occurred outside Freetown.  Many saw this as devaluing the suffering they endured during the earlier stages of the conflict.

This cleavage is further evident and compounded, when considering the distribution of different ethnic groups which constitute the Sierra Leone population and the languages in use within the country.  Although English is the official language, it is in effect the language of the political and social elite.  Indigenous languages include Krio, spoken largely in the capital and western region, Mende in the south, Themnet and Limba in the north, and Kono and Kuranko in the east.  Given the concentration of the political elite within Freetown, the de facto national language is Krio, with this being used for inter-ethnic communication.¹³

Given the rate of illiteracy within the country is put at over 50%,¹⁴  it becomes evident that the apparent benefits of the Special Court’s seat being Freetown, and its working language English are not so clear cut.  Any outreach and public information campaign that is to succeed must acknowledge these facts and incorporate them into the heart of the strategy from the onset.
 

4. Potential Outreach Program Partners

A successful outreach program geared towards the demands of Sierra Leone as a whole should be multifaceted, tailored according to whom the information is directed.  Containing enough flexibility to be able to respond to the needs of different groups within society, it should be devised to develop in parallel with the Court itself.  Thus, while the initial phase must concentrate on the nature of the institution itself, explaining its structure, its substantive law and its internal procedures, as the Special Court evolves and begins to hear trials, the outreach program must also evolve to ensure that the Court’s day to day hearings are understood within the country.

Before considering the specifics of any outreach program, it is necessary to identify a number of Sierra Leonean actors who will themselves play a crucial role within the program itself.  Not only will these actors almost certainly require an element of training themselves, to familiarise themselves with the Special Court, but they are also potential partners of the program and are, due to their nature and status in society, crucial to its success.

4.1 Legal Profession
Of crucial importance to the overall success of the operations of the Special Court, the legal profession is a highly visible and active member of Sierra Leone society.  Ensuring the profession clearly understands the nature of the Court will not only assist in contributing towards the legitimacy of the institution among wider society, it will lay the groundwork for increased capacity within the profession, ultimately contributing to the re-establishment of the rule of law to the country.

The membership of the Bar Association, together with the Law Faculty at the Fourah Bay College, should be considered a prime partner in the outreach campaign.  Although interest in the Special Court within the profession is obviously high, there is limited knowledge or direct experience of the substantive law within the Court’s jurisdiction.

4.2 Media
Central to the success of informing the wider public, Freetown has a vibrant media composed of the television, written press and radio.  However, despite some media within the provinces, it is almost exclusively located within the capital.

The national television station, Sierra Leone Broadcast Services (SLBS), broadcasts programs only during the evenings.  However, given the low ownership of television sets, coupled with the erratic power supply throughout the country, the medium should not be considered as central to any public education campaign.

According to the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, there are over 40 newspapers registered within the country, almost all located within the capital.  The majority appear daily, being simplified four page publications.  This gradual reduction in newsprint was itself a consequence of the conflict with the shortage of paper.  Some publications over the last few months have started to expand their column inches.  Coverage is given to domestic and international news, with much discussion concerning the Special Court, not all of it accurate, having taken place over the last 18 months.  The fact that the highest circulating paper has sales of around 2000 copies daily reflects the levels of illiteracy within the country.

As with many other societies on the continent, the radio is the chief media within Sierra Leone.  Most Sierra Leoneans seem to own at least one radio set and will religiously listen to the news, particularly the morning and afternoon BBC African programs.  Only one station, SLBS, is truly a nation-wide station, reaching the entire country with its shortwave broadcasts.  It also has provincial offices located in the regional capitals.  The other Freetown based station is Radio Democracy (98.1FM) which has a limited reception area of approximately 100 miles.  Additionally, Radio UNAMSIL also now broadcasts across the entire country via shortwave, with its morning breakfast show “Tea Break” growing in popularity.

Despite the difference in reach between the three, they should never the less be considered as a collective group, given the close relations within the profession.  Indeed, in the case of SLBS, there is great overlap between its radio and television operations.

As in any society, journalists play a central role as opinion formers in wider society and Sierra Leone is no different.  Targeting journalists for inclusion within the outreach program will ensure that accurate information is disseminated around the Sierra Leonean community.

4.3 Civil Society Organisations
The success of the public education will in large part be determined by the level of awareness within NGOs.  Sierra Leone has a large and active NGO community, with over 400 registered NGOs and CBOs whose mandates cover human rights, development and justice and peace issues alone.  Whilst the Freetown bias is again prevalent, never the less many of the national organisations have regional branches spread throughout the entire country.

Given the country is one in which communication is primarily through verbal means, the involvement of this sector within any public education is self-evident with them being best placed to disseminate information widely through their own networks.

The main group of NGOs relevant to any Special Court outreach program are those involved in human rights issues.  This community was highly vocal and active in insisting that that only by holding to account those responsible for the conflict within the country, and of the victims attaining some form of redress, would the conflict end.  Since the issue of the Special Court was raised in 2000, these NGOs have continued their activities to ensure the institution is as relevant to Sierra Leone as is possible.

Given the number of human rights organisations, the community decided to form an umbrella organisation in order to ensure that campaigns and activities were coordinated.  The National Forum for Human Rights (NFHR) was thus formed in 1998 and continues to act as a focal point for the entire community, with the majority of human rights organisations members.

Additionally two ad hoc working groups have been formed within the human rights community to address the dual accountability mechanisms being established within the country: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group and the Special Court Working Group.  Although established at different times, reflecting the evolution of the two proposed institutions, both working groups were established for similar reasons: to begin sensitising the human rights community and then the wider Sierra Leone public as to the nature of their respective institutions.

The later of these institutions should obviously be directly targeted for the outreach program.  Formally established in the middle of 2001, the group is located within Freetown, having branches in the three other regions.  Their mandate is exclusively to ensure that the accurate information is disseminated throughout the country and to this end, they have already been conducting sensitisation activities through community based events and radio broadcasts.  A variety of documents have been disseminated throughout Freetown and the provinces, including simplification leaflets concerning the central aspects of the Court.

Of other civil society organisations that should be viewed as potential partners and collaborators of the outreach program, attention should be paid particularly to those specialising in support and assistance to victims of the conflict and those working with and representing ex-combatants.

In the case of victim support groups, clear information will need to be disseminated towards the victims of the conflict who may be required to appear before the Special Court.  In particular, the mechanisms established within the Court to reassure potential witnesses that their security will be guaranteed should they be required to appear before the Court will need to be repeatedly stresses.  The victim support group would be ideally placed to ensure this information reaches the correct group.

In the case of ex-combatant groups, the need for dissemination of accurate information is self-evident.  From pilot sensitisation activities conducted already by the Special Court Working Group among ex-combatants, it is clear that there is a high level of apprehension that the court will be looking to prosecute all those involved in the conflict.  It has required repeated explanations of the centrality of the phrase “those who bear the greatest responsibility” to the personal jurisdiction of the Court, together with stress on the Court’s impartiality, to reassure this group that the vast majority of those involved in the conflict are unlikely to be prosecuted.

This pilot study itself reflects the necessity for widespread involvement of civil society organisations in outreach and public information.  In the case of the ex-combatants groups, once the group leaders were familiar with the Statue and Agreement of the Court, they were better placed as former combatants themselves to disseminate the information to their membership.  Such a result is likely to be repeated within other organisations.
 

5. Considerations for Outreach Strategy

As already noted, the strategies needed for sensitisation of the Sierra Leone public to the Special Court need to be varied according to whom the intended target is.  Some of the programs devised by the equivalent programs in The Hague and Arusha may prove to be as appropriate within Sierra Leone, whilst newer ideas may also need to be formulated.

The initial phase should continue to develop the work conducted over the previous 12 months, particularly with the Special Court Working Group, ensuring that as high a proportion as possible of the civil society elite, of the media and of the legal professional are cognisant of the nature of the Court.  Following the example of the two Tribunals, symposiums, conferences and workshops could be organised, allowing the members of these different groups the opportunity to meet with, question and establish a relationship with various Court personnel.

A partnership could then be established with the various groups to direct the public education program at the wider public. Radio panel discussion programs could be organised, specialised features printed in the press, and community based events held, led by civil society organisations.

The second phase should then evolve to consider how to continue disseminating information once trial proceedings commence and the Court’s activities become more visible.  Aside from the strategy devised by any Press Office incorporated into the Court’s structure to notify the media of day to day proceedings before the Court, consideration should be given to regular radio broadcasts.  If possible, “live”¹⁵  radio transmissions of trials could be broadcast across the airwaves, allowing the public to follow the proceedings directly.

Additionally, consideration should also be given to producing a weekly radio digest, broadcast at a regular time, covering the main developments of the previous week. Such a program could take many different formats, including interviews with different members of the Court’s personnel, coverage of trials and discussions.  As already stated, the importance of radio broadcasting within the country suggests that this should be the main medium of mass communication of information to the wider public.

Such coverage, whether of trial proceedings or of the digest, could be easily incorporated into the schedules of Radio UNAMSIL, the existence of which should be fully utilised and itself overcoming the need to follow the example of Arusha which intends to establish a Radio ICTR station.

Following the example of the Rwandan Tribunal, consideration should be given to establishing an Information Centre within Freetown.¹⁶   Allowing free access to members of the public, the Arusha Centre comprises of law library, a reading room, conference room, video library containing footage of ICTR hearings and a limited number of public access computers linked to internet.¹⁷   Such a centre could perform a vital role as a very public face of the Special Court, enabling the Sierra Leone public the opportunity to access consistent and reliable information on its proceedings.  Again, in an attempt to overcome the Freetown/Provinces division, a smaller Information Centre should be established in the provinces, with the country’s second city Bo seeming the obvious location.

The Freetown/Provinces cleavage could also be overcome by other means.  Video footage of Special Court activity could be edited into short films, which could then be toured around the country and broadcast at special community events.  The work here of the Internews in Rwanda acts as a perfect illustration.  Internews, accompanied by Tribunal personnel, travel around Rwanda and show regular updates of the Tribunal’s proceedings are in villages that would otherwise not have access to this information.  The films are followed by open discussions during which the audience has the opportunity to ask questions of the Tribunal personnel.¹⁸

 These suggestions are not intended to be exhaustive, merely illustrative of the possible strategies that could be adopted by the Special Court when considering effective means of public education.  If they point in any one firm direction, that it towards the need for any outreach programme to be conducted in partnership with Sierra Leonean organisations.  Being in the best possible position to understand the nature of their own society, civil society activists will be in the best position to confirm and suggest the most appropriate strategies to develop in any such campaign.  Further, promoting the visible involvement of Sierra Leoneans in the outreach and public education campaign will itself contribute towards establishing the legitimacy of the Special Court itself, ensuring the wider Sierra Leonean community clearly sees that it has a stake within the institution.

6. Conclusion

Broadly disseminated information is essential to the transparency of the Special Court, its credibility and ultimately its effectiveness.  If information is lacking, the danger exists that the void will be filled by misinformation spread by those seeking deliberately to exploit peoples fears and suspicions to discredit the Institution.  This could only impede the Court’s ability to function.

An Outreach and Public Education Program should be established from the inception of the Court to ensure that clear and accurate information is disseminated throughout Sierra Leone.  This program should be established in partnership with Sierra Leonean groups and organisations, many of whom have been directly engaged in the issue of the Special Court for over a year and have already begun these types of activities in respect of selected elements of Sierra Leonean society.

Such a program, organised in such a way, stands the best chance of ensuring the Special Court’s transparency and credibility, and promoting the notion of it being an inclusive institution, serving the needs of the people of Sierra Leone for effective accountability for the conflict in their country.

Footnotes
1. See Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, A/54/634, 22 November 1999, (Experts’ Report) at para. 97. [Return to text]
2. Justice Unknown, Justice Unsatisfied? Bosnian NGOs Speak about the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Kirsten Cibelli and Tamy Guberek, part of the Education and Public Inquiry and International Citizenship series at Tufts University. [Return to text]
3. Ibid. pp. 10 - 11. [Return to text]
4. Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, Human Rights Centre, International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California, Berkeley and the Centre for Human Right, University of Sarajevo, May 2000. [Return to text]
5. Ibid. p. 37. [Return to text]
6. Ibid.  See pp. 23 - 33. [Return to text]
7. Ibid. p 43. [Return to text]
8. “Gabrielle Kirk McDonald: From Civil Rights to War Crimes, A Pioneer Promotes the Rule of Law, Los Angeles Times Interview, Los Angeles Times, February 7,1999, by Kitty Felde. [Return to text]
9. Outreach Symposium Marks the First Successful Step in the Campaign for Better Understanding of the ICTY in the Former Yugoslavia, October 20, 1998, ICTY Press Release, CC/PIU/355-E. [Return to text]
10. See Press Briefing by the Spokesman for the ICTR, September 19, 2000, ICTR Press Release, ICTR/INFO-9-13-016. [Return to text]
11. See http://allafrica.com/sierraleone for listing of daily stories within sections of the Freetown based press. [Return to text]
12. See “So, what is the Special Court and what does it intend to achieve in the end?”. Report from the Special Court Training Seminars, Freetown, March 2001, No Peace Without Justice Sierra Leone Mission available at: http://www.specialcourt.org/Outreach/TTTReportFinal.html. [Return to text]
13. Although the number of languages spoken within Sierra Leone has been put at 23, this figure is almost certainly higher given the refugee movement within and around the country given the conflict in the region.  Those languages listed are the dominant languages within the country.  Krio is considered the formal national language for those who do not speak English, with an estimated 75% of the population believed to use it as their second language.  For full list of languages and further information, see: http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=Sierra+Leone. [Return to text]
14. UNESCO estimate for 2000 states illiteracy for men at 49.3% and women 77.4%.  See: http://www.un.org/Depts/unsd/social/literacy.html.  Many within the country would view the overall figure as being much higher. [Return to text]
15. Following the ICTY, security considerations insist that “live” broadcast of Trial Chamber proceedings are sent on a feed with a 30 minute delay. [Return to text]
16. It should be noted that on Monday, 7 January 2002, a “Special Court Information Centre” was established by the Special Court Working Group Sierra Leone, a coalition of Sierra Leonean NGOs working on issues surrounding the Special Court.  Consideration could therefore be given to establishing a partnership with this centre, in order to ensure it has the necessary information and funding to carry out this task. [Return to text]
17. See: Rwandan Visitors to ICTR Information Centre on the Rise, March 21st, 2001, available at www.hirondelle.org. [Return to text]
18. See: http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_reports. [Return to text]
 

This report was prepared by the Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice of Sierra Leone for the Special Court Task Force with the technical cooperation of No Peace Without Justice.